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THE PROBLEM OF SELECTING AND DRAFTING
AN INVESTMENT CLAUSE FOR A TRUST
I. INTRODUCTION
The benefits which the income beneficiary and remainderman
ultimately derive from a trust depend primarily, notwithstanding
the trustee's expertise, upon the investment powers which the
trustee has been given by the settlor. In selecting these investment
powers to be conferred by the trust instrument, the settlor and his
lawyer must consider two familiar problems.
The first problem is to determine the type of investment power
to give the trustee which will be most beneficial to both the income
beneficiary and remainderman, not only for today, but for the
duration of the trust. If the trustee is given uncontrolled discre-
tion in investing the trust estate, the corpus of the trust may be
jeopardized by speculative or imprudent investments.' On the
other hand, if the trust investment power is restrictive the bene-
ficiaries and remaindermen may be harmed by the trustee's in-
ability to make proper investments in light of changing needs of
the beneficiaries and economic fluctuations. Courts usually re-
quire that the trustee follow the investment directions contained in
the trust instrument regardless of whether they are actually in the
best interests of the income beneficiary and remainderman..2
The second problem is to draft the trust investment provision
to grant the trustee clearly and unambiguously the investment
powers intended by the settlor. If the investment provision is am-
biguous, the trustee will probably interpret it conservatively, there-
by depriving the beneficiaries of the maximum benefits which
they may have received from the trust had the investment clause
been clear.
II. TYPES OF INVESTMENT POWERS
There are three general types of investment powers which a
1 In the Matter of Estate of Knower, 121 Misc. 208, 200 N.Y. Supp. 777
(Surr. Ct. 1923), where the will provided that the trustee should not
be confined to legal investments, that he should be at liberty to invest
in such stocks, bonds, or other securities as he might deem proper, and
that he should not be liable for any loss unless occasioned by his actual
fraud. The estate sustained large losses on the stocks and bonds of
railroad and traction companies. The court held that the trustee was
not liable for the losses, saying that the evidence disclosed improvi-
dence, lack of prudence and negligence, but not actual fraud.
2 See In re Trust of McDonough, 252 Iowa 870, 109 N.W.2d 29 (1961).
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trustee may be given:3 (1) he may be authorized to invest in
securities authorized by the "legal list" statute; (2) he may be lim-
ited to certain named securities or types of securities; (3) he may be
given full investment powers.
In selecting an investment power to give the trustee, the settlor
must consider various factors.4 One of the most important, how-
ever, and the one which will be discussed in this article, is the
effect of the investment powers on the income beneficiary and re-
mainderman.
A. THE LEGAL LIST
Prior to 1902, all states imposed upon the fiduciary the basic
requirements of prudence, good faith, and the exercise of sound dis-
cretion in the selection of trust investments. However, two diver-
gent lines of authority characterized the definition of "prudence." 5
Massachusetts and the courts adopting the "Massachusetts rule"
followed the standard of "prudence" laid down by Judge Putnam
in Harvard College v. Armory.6 Under this standard, "mortgages,
government bonds, industrial securities, and any other investments
regarded by the reasonable, prudent man as sound and without the
stigma of dangerous speculation were regularly approved" invest-
ments.
7
In the ensuing thirty-nine years, however, the development
of a rich and growing country brought not only periods of great
3 See Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 288 (1949).
4 Some of the factors to be considered are: the purposes of the trust, the
age and relationship of the life beneficiary and remainderman to the
donor, the amount of income the life beneficiary receives outside of the
trust, and the mode of living to which the life beneficiary is accus-
tomed.
5 States followed the definition of "prudence" as set out in Harvard
College v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830), or the definition of
"prudence" as set out in King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869). In 1902,
however, New York passed its first "legal list" statute. See Torrance,
50 Years of Trust Investment, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 250, 251 (1954).
6 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). The court stated: "All that can be
required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faith-
fully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of
prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not
in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition
of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the prob-
able safety of the capital to be invested." See also Comment, 49 YALE
L.J. 891, 892 (1940).
7 Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 891, 892 n.14 (1940); see also Comment, 14
B.U.L. REV. 88 (1934).
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prosperity, but also periods of financial depression. The mixed
experiences of investors during this period of unregulated enter-
prises and meager investment information led to decisions such as
King v. Talbot," and suggested a need for some objective standards
for trust investments.0 In King, the court applied the same flexible
rule of "prudence" as used in the Harvard Colege case. However,
in the King case, the court restricted the scope of a prudent trustee's
discretion by declaring that all industrial stocks and bonds were
imprudent, speculative investments for fiduciaries. 0 In applying
this strict definition of "prudence," courts imposed "legal lists"
by judicial stare decisis, and trustees were often surcharged under
circumstances varying but slightly from the cases upon which they
had relied.' In view of such uncertainty, legislative action in many
states became imperative,' 2 and statutory "legal lists" were estab-
lished to promote protection for the trust corpus,1a a steady income
to the beneficiary,14 and certainty for the trustee.15
In 1933, the Nebraska Legislature established a list of legal in-
s 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
9 Torrance, supra note 5, at 252.
10 King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 89 (1869). "If it be said, that this reasoning
assumes, that it is certainly practicable so to keep the fund, that it
shall be productive, and yet safe against any contingency of loss;
whereas, in fact, if loaned upon bond and mortgage, or upon securities
of any description, losses from insolvency and depreciation may, and
often do happen, notwithstanding due and proper care and caution
is observed in their selection. Not at all. It assumes and insists, that
the trustee shall not place the fund where its safety and due return to
their hands will depend upon the success of the business in which it is
adventured, or the skill and honesty of other parties entrusted with its
conduct; and it is in the selection of the securities for its safety and ac-
tual return, that there is scope for discretion and prudence, which, if
exercised in good faith, constitute due performance of the duty of the
trustee." (Emphasis added.)
11 Compare Appeal of Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890), with
Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N.E. 761 (1931).
12 By 1936, only five states other than Massachusetts had not adopted some
form of "legal list" investment statute. See Comment, 15 ALA. L. REv.
79, 89 n.55 (1962). For a complete list of all trust investment statutes,
see BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 615-64 (2d ed. 1960).
13 See Torrance, Legal Background, Trends and Recent Developments in
the Investment ot Trust Funds, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 128, 134
(1952); Comment, 15 ALA. L. REV. 79, 83 (1962).
14 See Fingar, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 96 TRusTs &
ESTATES 864 (1957); Note, 49 HARV. L. REV. 821, 826 (1936); Note, 1
RUTGERS L. REv. 130, 138 (1947).
15 See Torrance, supra note 5, at 252; Comment, 15 ALA. L. REv. 79, 83-84
(1962); Note, 49 HARv. L. REv. 821- (1936).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 1
vestments. 16 Under this act, trustees were authorized to invest in
United States Government bonds, bonds of any city or political sub-
division in Nebraska, and bonds of cities of over 200,000 population
in the United States. Since 1933, the Nebraska "legal list" has been
amended nine times.17
On first reading, the Nebraska "legal list" seems to present an
imposing array of authorized securities which gives a beneficiary a
high yield of income, protects the corpus of the trust, and grants
to a trustee sufficient investment latitude. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the Nebraska "legal list" may be detrimental to the in-
come beneficiary and remainderman for the reasons discussed be-
low.
(1) The Legal List Tends to Freeze the Assets of the Trust Estate
in Their Original Investments.
The Nebraska "legal list" authorizes trustees to invest up to
forty per cent of the market value of the trust estate in common
stocks at the time of the original investment.18 The statute also
permits the trustee to reinvest proceeds from the sale of common
stocks back into commons, even though the market value of the
common stocks in the portfolio is above the forty per cent limit at
the time of the reinvestment.19 However, if the market value of the
common stocks is above the forty per cent limit, the trustee may
not invest proceeds of a sale of another type of legal security in
common stocks. 20 On the other hand, the trustee may be reluctant
to sell a common stock and invest the proceeds in an interest-bear-
ing security because, if the market value of the common stock is
above forty per cent, the trustee may be unable to reinvest the
funds taken from common stocks back into commons at a later date.
Thus, the forty per cent provision tends to freeze the assets of the
trust estate in their original form.
16 Neb. Laws c. 64, § 1 (1933).
17 Neb. Laws c. 68, § 1 (1935); Neb. Laws c. 60, § 1 (1937); Neb. Laws c.
66, § 1 (1943); Neb. Laws c. 56, § 1 (1945); Neb. Laws c. 79, § 1 (1947);
Neb. Laws c. 67, § 2 (1953); Neb. Laws c. 82, § 1 (1955); Neb. Laws c.
263, § 9 (1959); and Neb. Laws c. 134, § 1 (1963).
Is Neb. Laws c. 134, § 1, at 509 (1963): " . . . Provided, that no such
fiduciary shall be permitted to invest in excess of forty per cent of the
total approximate value of the account, at the time that such invest-
ment is made."
19 Neb. Laws c. 134, § 1 (1963).
20 For example, assume the market value of the common stocks in the
portfolio is 50%. A trustee could not sell a government bond and re-
invest the proceeds into commons.
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Also, because one of the purposes of the "legal list" is to provide
a list of prudent investments for the trustee,2 the courts' attention
to the trust investments is focused primarily on the question of
their formal compliance with the statute.22 Investments within the
"legal list" are prima facie evidence of prudence.2 3  Courts require
only that a trustee, who invests within the Nebraska "legal list,"
use that amount of discretion which a reasonable man would
employ in choosing investments from within the "legal list."2
4
Questions of intrinsic soundness of the particular investment in the
light of economic conditions, its relation to the other investments in
the portfolio and the financial situation of the beneficiaries are
relegated to a position of secondary importance in the determination
of the prudence of an investment.25 Thus, a trustee could use the
required reasonable judgment in originally investing, and then re-
fuse to make alterations in the investments even though subsequent
21 See Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 891 (1940): "Although the distinction be-
tween prudence and improvidence in the investment market is often
obscure, the trustee is obliged at his peril to discover that distinction,
and courts, often less qualified as investment experts, constantly as-
sume to do so. In recognition of the problems thus confronting the
trustee, and to provide some security from the ever-present danger of
surcharge, courts and legislatures early attempted a more definitive
classification of permissible trust investments in what were generally
known as 'legal lists.' "
22 See Whyte, Should the Prudent Man Rule for Trust Investments Be
Adopted in Wisconsin?, 1945 WIs. L. REv. 499.
23 See Note, 46 YALE L.J. 1085, 1086 (1937): "Although investments of
trust funds in securities included in such a list [legal listsj does not
absolve the trustee from his duty of using reasonable care, it is prima
facie evidence of prudence, and only in exceptional cases of this sort
are trustees surcharged for losses." See also BOGERT, op. cit. supra
note 12, § 614.
24 Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368, 375, 76 N.W.2d 239, 245 (1956). In de-
fining the discretionary duty of care required by a trustee, the court
stated: " 'If discretion is conferred upon the trustee in the exercise
of a power, the court will not interfere unless the trustee in exercising
or failing to exercise the power acts dishonestly, or with an improper
even though not a dishonest motive, or fails to use his judgment, or
acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment."' (Emphasis added.)
The court further stated: " 'The mere fact that, if the discretion had
been conferred upon the court, the court would have exercised the
power differently is not ordinarily a sufficient reason for interfering
with the exercise of power by the trustee.' " Ibid. See also Reed v.
Ringsby, 156 Neb. 33, 54 N.W.2d 318 (1952); In re Will of Sullivan, 144
Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943); In re Estate of Linch, 136 Neb. 705, 287
N.W. 88 (1939); In re Estate of Vohland, 135 Neb. 77, 280 N.W. 241
(1938); Burnham v. Bennison, 121 Neb. 291, 236 N.W. 745 (1931).
25 See Note, 1 RUTGERS L. REv. 130, 134 (1947).
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fluctuations in the investment market may indicate that a change
would be advisable.
(2) The Legal List Imposes Diversification According to Formula.
Although the argument for increased diversification has been
competently handled in many articles expounding the pros and
cons of the "legal list, '26 diversification warrants some mention
here because under normal conditions it is classified as a prime
element of consideration in any prudent investment policy.27
The purpose of diversification is to spread the inherent risk of
loss of investments over a number of different kinds of invest-
ments.28  Diversification, however, does not imply investing rela-
tive proportions of the trust estate in fixed-income securities and
common stocks29-such as the Nebraska "legal list" requires. 30 To
achieve diversification it is necessary to evaluate investment policies
in the light of the circumstances of each trust estate. Further, it
is necessary to consider the economic, political, and international
trends, together with new discoveries in manufacturing processes,
peace-war changes in demand, and economic recessions and infla-
26 See Buek, "Qualified" Trustee Performance Calls for Full Investment
Freedom, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 194 (1960); Chapman, Fallacies in Trust
Investment Policy, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 813 (1956); Goodenough, Lib-
eralize Trust Investment Powers, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 453 (1951);
Jennett, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES
843 (1955); Torrance, supra note 13; Note, 1 RUTGERS L. REV. 130 (1947);
Comment, 36 IowA L. REV. 341 (1951); Comment 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 788
(1958); Comment, 18 U. Cxr. L. REv. 92 (1951); Comment, 58 YALE L.J.
288 (1949).
27 See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 12, § 612; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 228 (1959); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 228 (2d ed. 1956); Dicus, The Trustee's
Dilemma-Retention or Diversification of Investments, 95 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 1130 (1956).
28 See Scully, Changing Concepss of Trust Investments, 97 TRUSTS & Es-
TATES 912 (1958).
29 Id. at 918: "Diversification does not mean a precise division at the
half-way mark between stocks and bonds or a precise distribution of
the various types of securities for each and every trust. The merits
of the particular security for the particular objective must be weighed.
There is no single yardstick for measuring diversification. In each case
a comprehensive analysis of securities suitable for the particular ac-
count is required, after which a studied choice may be made of the
most favorable investment opportunities in each area best serving the
purposes of the account. Expert management is essential in both initial
selection and continuing supervision of securities to test their present
and future suitability for the trust portfolio."
SO See Neb. Laws c. 134, § 1 (1963).
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tions. The trust investment selection requires immediate profes-
sional skill, and not the mechanical application of an arbitrary for-
mula drafted by the Nebraska Legislature approximately twenty
years ago.
Courts in other jurisdictions have taken judicial notice of a
need for diversity in trust investment. States following the Massa-
chusetts prudent man rule have generally held that a trustee is
under a duty to diversify investments per se,31 although the courts
have not adopted any arbitrary rule of percentages of the whole
fund that may be safely held in one form of security. Courts in
jurisdictions which have adopted a modified prudent man rule by
statute, such as New York,8 2 have generally held that a trustee has
no duty to diversify investments per se.33 However, these jurisdic-
tions have held that if a trustee invests a substantial portion of the
trust estate in one security, or type of security, the trustee may be
surcharged for failure to exercise the required care, skill, and cau-
tion of an ordinarily prudent man.3 4
81 See First Nat'l Bank v. Hyde, 363 S.W.2d 647, 654 (Mo. 1963): "'Ex-
cept as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to distribute the risk of loss by a rea-
sonable diversification of investments, unless under the circumstances
it is prudent not to do so.' " See also Mandel v. Cemetery Bd., 185
Cal. App. 2d 583, 8 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Day v. First
Trust & Say. Bank, 47 Cal. App. 2d 470, 118 P.2d 51 (Dist. Ct. App.
1941); BOG.ERT, op. cit. supra note 12, § 612; RESTATEAMNT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 228 (1959); 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 27, § 228; Annot., 131
A.L.R. 1158 (1941); Scully, supra note 28, at nn.9-12.
82 N.Y. Psms. PROP. LAW § 21. A modified prudent man statute is a "legal
list" which imposes the additional duty on the trustee to invest with-
in the "legal list" with the care of a prudent man, who, through dis-
cretion and intelligence in such matters, is seeking a reasonable income
and the preservation of his capital.
83 See Matter of Kellogg, 35 Misc. 2d 541, 230 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct.
1962). In the Matter of Will of Kilmer, 18 Misc. 2d 60, 186 N.Y.S.2d
120 (Surr. Ct. 1959), held that the trustee was not under a duty to
diversify per se, even though over two-thirds of the corpus consisted
of nontaxable bonds. See also In re Nuese's Estate, 25 N.J. Super.
406, 96 A.2d 298 (Essex County Ct. P. Div. 1953); In re City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 189 Misc. 942, 68 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1947); In re
Beebe's Estate, 52 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Surr. Ct. 1943); In the Matter of Es-
tate of Gottschalk, 167 Misc. 397, 4 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Surr. Ct. 1938). But
cf. President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Erlandsen, 36 N.Y.S.2d
136 (Sup. Ct. 1942). See generally Annot., 131 A.L.R. 1158 (1941).
84 See In re Ward, 121 N.J. Eq. 555, 192 Atl. 68 (Prerog. Ct. 1936), where
four-fifths of the trust estate was invested in bank securities within
a certain locality. The court held the trustee liable for the loss to the
trust. The court stated: "[O]ne of the first principles of safe invest-
ment is diversity in the type of investment and in the localities upon
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No court in Nebraska has decided the issue of diversification.
It is submitted, however, that an income beneficiary and remainder-
man may be protected from lack of diversification of investments if
the trustee has full investment powers; whereas, they may not be
protected if he is limited to "legals." If the trustee is limited to
"legals" all he need do is use reasonable judgment in selecting
securities35 which the Nebraska Legislature has already desig-
nated as prudent.8 6 On the other hand, a trustee who is given full
investment powers must exercise that degree of care that a prudent
man would exercise.3 7 The securities in which he invests are not
prudent per se, as under the "legal list," but rather, they are only
prudent if an ordinary prudent man would make such an invest-
ment.38 As stated above, courts have held that an ordinary pru-
dent man would not invest a substantial portion of the trust es-
tate in one security or type of security. Thus, it would seem that
the income beneficiary and remainderman may have more protec-
tion where the trustee has full investment powers than where his
investment power is limited to the "legal list."
(3) The Legal List Fails to Protect the Purchasing Power of the
Trust Estate.
In times of recurring inflation and rising taxes, advocates of
equity investments argue that the limitations imposed by the "legal
list" on the amount of common stocks in a trust portfolio make it
impossible for a trustee to preserve the purchasing power of a trust
estate.39  Although courts have been cognizant of this argument,
they have failed to take judicial action to preserve the purchasing
power of the trust estate.40  Legislatures, on the other hand, have
which the securities depend." Id. at 562, 192 Atl. at 72. See also Com-
mercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, 27 N.J. 332, 142 A.2d 865 (1958); Cobb
v. Gramatan Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 261 App. Div. 1086, 26 N.Y.S.2d
917 (1941) ; BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 12, § 612; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
TRUSTS § 228 (1959); 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 27, § 228.
35 See cases cited note 24 supra.
86 See cases cited notes 21, 22, 23, 25 supra.
37 See First Trust Co. v. Exchange Bank, 126 Neb. 856, 254 N.W. 569
(1934). See also text accompanying notes 60-69 infra.
38 Ibid. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 227 (1959); 3 SCOTT,
op. cit. supra note 27, § 227.
39 This argument is made in Scully, supra note 28, at 912. See also Com-
ment, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 788 (1958).
40 Courts have given two arguments for rejecting the purchasing power
argument. The first argument is centered around the idea that the
purposes of the trusts are almost always the production of a moderate
income temporarily and the conservation of capital until a future date.
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recognized the purchasing power argument and allow trustees to
offset inflationary trends by making increased investments in com-
mon stocks.41
Even with legislative action, however, the problem of preserv-
ing the purchasing power of the trust estate has not been com-
pletely solved. 42 Bascom H. Torrance43 points out that there is no
consistent relationship between commodity prices and stock prices
in general.
Instead of any consistent relationship there are some rather notable
periods of divergence. The most striking was during the period
from 1915 to 1930, which included the rampant bull market of the
late 1920's, when stocks rose sharply against a generally stationary
trend for commodity prices. It is also interesting to note that
stocks failed to follow the sharp rise in wholesale prices which be-
gan in 1945 and continued through 1948. 44
Thus, legislative action which permits the trustee to invest a
greater percentage of the trust estate in common stock does not
necessarily alleviate the problems of depreciating purchasing power.
These problems are products of a moving economy and the only
manner in which a trustee can adequately deal with them is by
having increased range and flexibility of investment powers.45
Investments may rarely, if ever, be made from a speculative point of
view. The trustee must keep in mind the selection of a security which
will to a satisfactory extent accomplish the main objects of the trust,
which usually are the furnishing of a continuous flow of at least moder-
ate income and the guarantee of safety of the principal. The trustee
should not invest to increase the capital fund. See Bo.ERT, op. cit. supra
note 12, § 612; 3 SCoTT, Op. cit. supra note 27, § 227. The second reason
courts have been reluctant to impose the duty of preserving the pur-
chasing power upon the trustee is that this would burden the court
with the duty of determining whether the purchasing power of estate
assets at the end of an accounting period were at least equivalent to
the purchasing power of such assets at the time they were received.
See also Scully, supra note 28, at 915.
41 See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 615-64. See also Neb. Laws c.
66, § 1 (1943); Neb. Laws c. 79, § 1 (1947); Neb. Laws c. 82, § 1 (1955);
Neb. Laws c. 134, § 1 (1963).
42 The following argument was taken from Torrance, supra note 13.
43 Bascom H. Torrance is vice president of the City Bank Farmers Trust
Company and the National City Bank of New York. He acts as senior
investment officer over trusts and estates. In 1954 he was a member
of the executive committee of the Trust Division, New York State
Bankers Association.
44 See Torrance, supra note 13, at 147-48.
45 Id. at 147.
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(4) Summary-Legal List
The "legal list" statutes evolved from the New York court's
definition of prudent investments for trustees, and at that time, it
may be argued that there was a need to restrict the investments of
trustees to certain fixed income securities. Today, however, the
economic conditions which characterized the latter half of the
nineteenth century and the first thirty years of the twentieth cen-
tury no longer exist.
Today ... we have abundant evidence that these statutory restric-
tions can be a hindrance rather than a help. For a time, however,
they served a purpose; they were "period pieces," and like other
things that outlive their usefulness, they are passing from the scene,
after the fashion of the horse car, the hoop skirt, and the bustle.46
The "legal list" tends to freeze the assets of the trust in their
original investment form, imposes diversification by formula, and
fails to preserve the purchasing power of the trust estate. The
"legal list" often breeds complacency and provides only a "safe"
zone in which the trustee may invest the trust funds regardless of
the destructive long term effects on the trust assets.
47
B. SPECIFIC AUTHORIzATIoN IN THE TRUST INSTRUMENT TO INVEST
IN CERTAIN SECURITIES OR TYPES OF SEcURITIES
A settlor may limit the investment powers of the trustee to
certain specified securities. For example, a trustee may be directed
to limit his investments to United States Government bonds, real
estate mortgages, and preferred stocks.
The above type of investment power contains most of the
limitations present in the "legal list," without any corresponding
advantages. 48  Most important, however, this type of investment
power may, at some future date, be detrimental to the income bene-
ficiary and remainderman, unless the settlor performs the formid-
able task of foreseeing and anticipating future fluctuations in the
investment market.49
46 Torrance, supra note 5, at 252.
17 See Comment, 15 ALA. L. REV. 79, 101 (1962).
48 Diversification is lacking in both "legal list" and investment in cer-
tain securities. However, the "legal list" is usually broader in the scope
of its authorized securities than the special investment powers are.
Also, the legislature can at some time change the types of authorized
securities in the "legal list," whereas courts are very reluctant to per-
mit deviation from the terms of the trust by the trustee.
49 In re Trust of McDonough, 252 Iowa 870, 109 N.W.2d 29 (1961), where
the beneficiary of a testamentary charitable trust brought suit to force
the trustee to convert the corpus from farm land to interest-bearing
securities in order to receive more income. The application was denied
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Courts are generally guided by the terms of the trust instru-
ment50 and will allow deviation only where the performance of the
terms of the trust is impossible,51 illegal,52 contrary to public pol-
icy,53 or where such unanticipated circumstances are present that
compliance with the terms of the trust would defeat or substan-
tially impair the accomplishment of its purposes. 4 This power of
the courts to allow deviation, however, is recognized as an extra-
ordinary power which is invoked cautiously and sparingly.55 De-
viation is not permitted solely to increase the beneficiary's income,5 6
aid one beneficiary at the expense of another,57 or merely because
by the trial court on the ground that the wording of the bequest in-
dicated that the lands were to be retained.
50 Valley Nat'l Bank v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 60 Ariz. 286, 136 P.2d
458 (1943); Floyd v. Rankin, 86 Cal. 159, 24 Pac. 936 (1890); Stanton
v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 310 P.2d
1010 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); In re Huntington's Will, 210 N.Y.S.2d 441
(Surf. Ct. 1960). See generally 4 POMIERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §
1062 (5th ed. 1941); Scott, Deviation From the Terms of a Trust, 44
HAiv. L. REV. 1025 (1931); Comment, 47 IowA L. REV. 803 (1962); Com-
ment, 20 NEB. L. REV. 133 (1941); Comment, 15 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv.
108 (1958).
GI See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ghio, 240 Mo. App. 1033, 222 S.W.2d
556 (1949); In the Matter of Estate of Simons, 16 Misc. 2d 352, 182
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Surr. Ct. 1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 165,
381 (1959).
52 See Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S.W. 1057 (1921); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRUSTS §§ 166, 381 (1959).
58 See Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 At. 555 (1926).
See also Scott, supra note 50, at 1031-33.
54 See John A. Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 299 N.W. 261
(1941), where the Nebraska Supreme Court allowed deviation from
the terms of the trust because compliance with the terms of the trust
in making investments would thwart the purposes of the trust. See
also 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 27, § 167.
55 See Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 198, 145 Atl. 648, 652 (1929), where
the court stated: "[T]he very nature of the authority given trustees un-
der this principle necessarily requires, that it should be most carefully
and sparingly used, and it is to be borne in mind that it is the necessity
of the situation which brings it into operation,, not the mere fact that
thereby the estate may be administered in a way which will be more
advantageous to its beneficiaries." See also 4 PomERoY, op. cit. supra
note 50, § 1062 (b).
56 Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763,
310 P.2d 1010 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); In re Trust Under Will of Jones,
221 Minn. 524, 22 N.W.2d 633 (1946); Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 291
S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956). See also 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 167 (2d ed. 1956).
57 See In re Trust Under Will of Cosgrave, 225 Minn. 443, 31 N.W.2d 20
(1948). See also 2 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 56, § 167; Comment, 20 NEB.
L. REV. 133, 134 (1941).
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it would be beneficial to the trust.58
C. GRANT OF FULL INVESTMENT POWERS
A grant of "full discretion" to the trustee in investing the trust
estate is, in most cases, the most beneficial to the income benefici-
ary and remainderman. It gives the income beneficiary and re-
mainderman a chance to derive benefit from investment according
to sound principles of finance, rather than according to a rigid
formula. The trustee can select investments according to:59 (1)
the nature, purpose, and objectives of the trust; (2) the age and re-
lationship of the life beneficiaries to the donor, settlor, or testator;
(3) the age and relationship of the remainderman to the donor,
settlor, or testator; (4) the degree of dependency of the life bene-
ficiary upon sources of income outside the trust; and (5) the mode
of living to which he has been accustomed.
In Nebraska, the duty of care which a trustee must exercise
when given full investment powers is similar to the duty of care
which a trustee must employ under the Massachusetts prudent
man rule.60 It seems that the only difference in the application of
the Nebraska prudent man rule and the Massachusetts prudent
man rule is that the trustee in Nebraska has a primary duty of
preserving the trust corpus and a secondary duty of providing in-
58 See In re Trust Under Will of Jones, 221 Minn. 524, 22 N.W.2d 633
(1946); Thompson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956).
59 The following elements to be considered in trust investments were tak-
en from Bardt, Selection of Securities, 91 TRUSTS & ESTATES 742, 743
(1952).
60 Only where the trustee is granted full investment powers has the Ne-
braska Supreme Court adopted the "prudent man rule." In First Trust
Co. v. Exchange Bank, 126 Neb. 856, 867-68, 254 N.W. 569, 574 (1934),
the court stated: "As a general rule, the measure of care and diligence
required of a trustee is such as would be pursued by a man of ordinary
prudence and skill in the management of his own estate. . . .He must
act honestly and faithfully, in what he believes to be the best interests
of the cestui que trust. He must exercise sound discretion. He is
bound to proceed with diligence in investigating the nature of the pro-
posed investment, and to use such care in deciding as, in general, prud-
ent men of intelligence and integrity in such matters would employ in
their own affairs when making a permanent investment in which the
primary object is the preservation of the fund, and the secondary one
that of obtaining an income therefrom." See also State ex rel. Ebke
v. Board of Educ. Lands & Funds, 154 Neb. 244, 47 N.W.2d 520 (1951);
In re Estate of Linch, 136 Neb. 705, 287 N.W. 88 (1939); Whaley v.
Matthews, 134 Neb. 875, 280 N.W. 159 (1938); First Trust Co. v. Carl-
sen, 129 Neb. 118, 261 N.W. 333 (1935). Compare the Massachusetts
"prudent man rule" as expounded by Judge Putnam in Harvard Col-
lege v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
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come to the income beneficiary; whereas, under the Massachusetts
prudent man rule the trustee has an equal obligation of preserving
the corpus and providing income.61
The specific application of the prudent man rule by the courts
has been compiled in excellent annotations and treatises.6 2 Hence,
only a broad outline of the duty required of the trustee under the
prudent man rule will be attempted here.6 3
Generally, the duty of exercising that degree of care in invest-
ing that an ordinary prudent man would exercise, requires the
trustee to: (1) exercise a reasonable degree of care in selecting in-
vestments; 64 (2) exercise a reasonable degree of skill in making the
selection;6 5 and (3) exercise the caution which a prudent man
61 The Nebraska courts, in adopting the "prudent man rule," have ex-
pressly declared that the trustee must invest with the primary duty
of preserving the corpus, and the secondary duty of providing income.
See John A. Creighton Home v. Waltman, 140 Neb. 3, 299 N.W. 261
(1941); First Trust Co. v. Exchange Bank, 126 Neb. 856, 254 N.W. 569
(1934). On the other hand, trustees investing under the Massachu-
setts prudent man rule have an equal duty of preserving the corpus
and providing income. See Harvard College v. Armory, 26 Mass.
(9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
62 See BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 612 (2d ed. 1960); 3 SCoTT, TRUSTS
§ 227 (2d ed. 1956); SHATTUCK & FARR, ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK
518-45 (2d ed. 1953); Goodenough, Liberalize Trust Investment Powers,
90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 453 (1951); Lewis, The Prudent Man Investment
Rule, 35 ILL. B.J. 65 (1946); Torrance, Legal Background, Trends, and
Recent Developments in the Investment of Trust Funds, 17 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 128 (1952); Torrance, 50 Years of Trust Investment,
93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 250 (1954); Torrance, New Trust Investment
Law-New York Gets Partial Prudent Man Rule, 89 TRUSTS & ESTATES
300 (1950); Comment, 15 ALA. L. REv. 79 (1962); Note, 23 WASH. L.
REV. 78 (1948).
63 The following generalities were taken from BOGERT, op. cit. supra
note 62, § 612; 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 62, § 227.
64 Under the requirement of reasonable care, the trustee must make a
reasonable investigation as to the safety of the investment and as to
the amount of income which will probably be received. The past
history of the security must be examined. In making his decision
as to the propriety of the investment, a trustee may seek the advice
of other prudent men experienced in investing. However, the trustee
is not justified in relying wholly upon the advice of others. See 3
ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 62, § 227.1.
65 The requirement of exercising a reasonable degree of skill employs
an external standard-that of a reasonably prudent man. It is no
defense to the trustee that he does not possess the necessary degree
of skill. Also, if a trustee possesses a higher degree of skill than a
reasonably prudent man possesses, then the trustee is judged by this
higher degree of skill. See 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 62, § 227.2.
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would exercise where a primary consideration is the preservation
of the fund invested.66
The duty to use the care of an ordinary prudent man is
absolute, and even though the trustee was honest and well-inten-
tioned, such honesty will not excuse him from exercising the re-
quired amount of diligence and prudence.67 Generally, the duty of
prudence requires the trustee to diversify his investments.6 8 The
trustee must take active charge of the estate, which includes making
the corpus productive and disposing of unproductive securities.6 9
III. DRAFTING THE INVESTMENT CLAUSE
The problems of drafting an investment clause which will give
the trustee the investment powers intended by the settlor are just
66 A trustee must be cautious. Scott suggests that the requirement of
caution imposes a duty on the trustee to take such care in investing
the trust estate as an ordinary prudent man would take "'if he were
minded to make an investment for the benefit of other people for
whom he felt morally bound to provide."' 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note
62, § 227.3. See also BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 62, at 413; 3 SCOTT,
op. cit. supra note 62, § 227.6.
67 See In re Estate of Linch, 136 Neb. 705, 713, 287 N.W. 88, 93 (1939):
"'It is well settled that every violation by a trustee of a duty which
equity lays upon him, whether wilful and fraudulent, or done through
negligence, or arising through mere oversight or forgetfulness, is a
breach of trust. The term therefore includes every omission or com-
mission which violates in any manner either of the three great obliga-
tions ... of carrying out the trust according to its terms, of care and
diligence in protecting and investing the trust property, and of using
perfect good faith.'" See also Johnson v. Richards, 155 Neb. 552, 52
N.W.2d 737 (1952); Rettinger v. Pierpont, 145 Neb. 161, 15 N.W.2d 393
(1944); Whaley v. Matthews, 134 Neb. 875, 280 N.W. 159 (1938); First
Trust Co. v. Carlsen, 129 Neb. 118, 261 N.W. 333 (1935).
68 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS § 228 (1959); 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra
note 62, § 228. See also Bliss, Prudence in Investing-1933 and Now,
101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 482 (1962). Bliss points out that in a recent
survey by the American Bankers Association they found that corpo-
rate trustees carried approximately sixty-five per cent of the trust
estate in common stocks. For more information about the trends of
diversification in trust investment, see Clark, Equities to Debts and
Back Again, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1110 (1957); Driscoll, Equities on
Intrinsic Value, 89 TRUSTS & ESTATES 318 (1950); Jennett, Changing
Concepts of Trust Investment, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 843 (1955); Miller,
Common Stocks, Taxes and Prices-Protecting Economic Place of Bene-
ficiaries, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 234 (1958); Strong, The Big Challenge-
Equities Permanent Part of Investment Fabric, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES
996 (1957).
69 See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 62, § 612; 3 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 62,
§ 227; SHATTucK & FAR, op. cit. supra note 62, at 518-45.
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as important as the initial determination of the type of investment
powers to be given. Although these problems are present in all
jurisdictions, the interpretations and effects of investment clauses
differ from state to state because of variations in investment
statutes.70 Therefore, only the problems of drafting investment
clauses which are peculiar to Nebraska will be considered.
A. THE LEGAL LIST
In Nebraska, the donor who wishes to limit investments to
the "legal list" need but remain silent. The purpose clause of the
Nebraska Trust Investment Statute provides that trustees, guard-
ians, executors, and administrators, having funds for investment,
shall invest them in the "legal list" unless otherwise provided by
the trust instrument.7 1 Thus, if the trust instrument is silent con-
cerning the investment powers of the trustee, the trustee is auto-
matically limited to investments authorized by the "legal list."
B. SPECIAL INVESTMENT POWERS
Drafting an investment clause which gives trustees the power
to invest in certain securities is one of the most difficult problems
in draftsmanship. If, however, the donor wishes to give the
trustee special powers of investment, the easiest method is to add or
subtract from the "legal list."72 For instance, the donor may direct
a trustee to "invest in corporate revenue bonds and such securities
as may be legal for trustees."73
A major problem inherent in granting a trustee special invest-
ment powers is whether the testator's authorization to invest in
certain securities is permissive or mandatory.7 4  If permissive,
70 See 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 62, § 227.14, at 1701: "It is in each case a
question of interpretation whether or not the terms of the trust enlarge
the scope of permissible investments and if so to what extent. This
depends upon how broad the scope of proper trust investments is in
the particular state in the absence of a provision in the trust instru-
ment and upon the breadth of the language used in the instrument."
71 See Neb. Laws c. 134, § 1 (1963).
72 Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 288, 294 (1949).
73 This investment provision is purely hypothetical for purposes of illus-
tration.
74 In re Shafer's Will, 69 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Surr. Ct. 1947), held that an in-
vestment power which "authorized" a trustee to invest in certain
securities was permissive. But cf. President & Directors of Manhattan
Co. v. Erlandsen, 36 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1942), where it was held
that an investment provision which "authorized" investments in cer-
tain securities or in legal securities was mandatory and the trustee
was able only to invest in the specifically named securities.
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the trustee is not limited to the investments specifically men-
tioned.7 5  If, however, the investment provision is mandatory, the
trustee is limited to those securities enumerated.76 Generally,
courts have held the investment provision mandatory where it
announces, "I direct my executors and trustees to convert all my
property into first class interest bearing real estate mortgage secur-
ities and keep the same so invested. 17 7 Also, where a will states
that a trustee shall invest in certain securities courts would prob-
ably hold the investment provision mandatory.7 8  However, where
a will announces that a trustee may invest, or a trustee is author-
ized to invest, the courts will probably hold these provisions per-
missive.7 9
Trust provisions which purport to list certain securities as au-
thorized investments may run into difficulty with the rule of
ejusdem generis, i.e., where certain things are enumerated, and a
more general description is coupled with the enumeration, the gen-
eral expression covers only things which are ejusdem generis, that
is, of the like kind with those enumerated.8 0 This rule, however,
is merely a rule of construction raising a presumption that the in-
vestments authorized by the general clause were intended by the
settlor to be of the like kind and quality as the securities specifically
authorized.8 ' Where the more general clause is devoid of meaning
if restricted by the rule of ejusdem generis, and is given a meaning
and purpose if allowed its normal interpretation, the courts will
usually not apply the rule.8 2
75 See In re Shafer's Will, 69 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
76 See President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Erlandsen, 36 N.Y.S.2d
136 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
77 See In re Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. 106, 3 A.2d 326 (1939), which held that
"I order and direct" was mandatory. See also In re Shaw's Estate,
122 N.J. Eq. 536, 195 Atl. 525 (Prerog. Ct. 1937); In the Matter of
Estate of Irwin, 59 Misc. 143, 112 N.Y. Supp. 205 (Surr. Ct. 1908);
In re Mendel's Will, 164 Wis. 136, 159 N.W. 806 (1916).
78 See cases cited note 77 supra.
79 Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605 (1936), held that
an investment clause which gave the trustee power to invest as he
may see fit was permissive. See also In the Matter of Estate of Ham-
ersley, 152 Misc. 903, 274 N.Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. 1934). But cf.
In re Bruen's Estate, 83 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
80 For example, see In re Sanders' Estate, 304 Ill. App. 57, 25 N.E.2d 923
(1940). See also Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 12, 21 (1961).
81 See Armot., 78 A.L.R.2d 12, 21 (1961).
82 See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Lewis, 122 Conn. 384, 189 Atl. 178
(1937); In the Matter of Trust of Friberg, 199 Misc. 593, 100 N.Y.S.2d
343 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Irving Trust Co. v. Natica, 157 Misc. 32, 284 N.Y.
Supp. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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C. FULL POWERS
In drafting a trust instrument in which the donor wishes to
give the trustee full powers of investment, the donor should be
aware of the fact that the Nebraska Trust Investment Statute will
limit the trustee to "legals" unless otherwise provided in the trust
instrument.8 3 Also, a clause in a will or trust instrument which is
relied upon as authorizing a trustee to make nonlegal investments,
will be strictly construed by the courts against the existence of such
a power.84 Consequently, any intention of the testator or settlor to
authorize a trustee to go beyond the ordinary limits imposed by
law upon fiduciaries must be expressed clearly and unambigu-
ously.85
A good illustration of an investment clause which gives the
trustee full investment powers is: The trustee is hereby expressly
authorized and empowered to change, invest and reinvest in such
stocks (of any classification), bonds, common stock funds, other
securities, and other property, whether or not of the same kind,
without regard to the proportion such property or property of a
similar character so held may bear to the entire amount held, as in
their discretion may determine, and whether or not the same be
authorized by law for the investment of trust funds.8 6
The problems of construction of "full power" clauses arise
where the trust instrument does not clearly state that the trustee
may invest in nonlegals. Courts in other jurisdictions have gen-
erally found that where a trustee is authorized to invest "in his dis-
cretion," the trustee is not limited to "legals.' 8 7  Phrases such as
83 See the Purpose Clause in Neb. Laws c. 134, § 1 (1963).
84 See In -re New Rochelle Trust Co., 50 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Hale Estate, 347 Pa. 177, 180, 32 A.2d 20, 21 (1943): "The pre-
sumption is against the existence of such power [the power to invest
in nonlegals], and all doubts are resolved against the party assert-
ing it." See also Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 125 Conn. 349,
5 A.2d 852 (1939); Equitable Trust Co. v. Snader, 20 Del. Ch. 278, 174
Atl. 132 (Ch. Ct. 1934); Clark v. Clark, 167 Ga. 1, 144 S.E. 787 (1928);
Taylor's Estate, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Atl. 310 (1923); Welch v. Welch,
235 Wis. 282, 290 N.W. 758 (1940).
85 See In the Matter of Estate of Whitmore, 172 Misc. 277, 15 N.Y.S.2d
379 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
86 The substance of this investment provision was taken from 12 Am
JuR. Legal Forms § 1543 (1955).
87 See, e.g., Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 InI.
86, 95 N.E. 59 (1911); In the Matter of Estate of Libman, 26 Misc. 2d
854, 203 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Surr. Ct. 1960); In the Matter of Wind, 1
Misc. 2d 260, 145 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Surr. Ct. 1955); In the Matter of Estate
of Maloney, 120 Misc. 456, 198 N.Y. Supp. 788 (Surf. Ct. 1923);
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 1
"to invest as he may think best,"8 "as may be advised,"8 9 or "for
the best interests of my estate,"90 have generally been held to be
synonymous with a general grant of discretion; such phrases indi-
cating a "freedom of choice" rather than a limitation to "legals."91
Carr Estate, 355 Pa. 438, 50 A.2d 330 (1947). But cf. Clark v. Clark,
167 Ga. 1, 144 S.E. 787 (1928), where "in their discretion" did not au-
thorize investments in nonlegals.
88 See, e.g., Arnette v. Watson, 203 Iowa 552, 213 N.W. 270 (1927); In the
Matter of Life's Fresh Air Fund, 9 Misc. 2d 1026, 171 N.Y.S.2d 370,
371 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ("as to them seem best" authorized trustee to in-
vest in nonlegal securities); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Leach, 168 Misc.
526, 5 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1938); In the Matter of Estate of Das,
24 Misc. 2d 40, 202 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Surr. Ct. 1960); In the Matter of
Will of Jeffress, 198 Misc. 249, 97 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re
Ball's Will, 24 N.Y.S.2d 432, 435 (Surr. Ct. 1940) (trustee not limited
to "legals" when authorized "to invest the proceeds of all such sales
and exchanges in any property it thinks best"); In the Matter of Es-
tate of Wilkes, 172 Misc. 623, 15 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Surr. Ct. 1939); In the
Matter of Estate of Clark, 165 Misc. 801, 1 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Surr. Ct.
1938); In the Matter of Estate of Boulware, 144 Misc. 235, 258 N.Y.
Supp. 522 (Surr. Ct. 1932); In the Matter of Estate of Storts, 142 Misc.
54, 253 N.Y. Supp. 834 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Willis v. Braucher, 79 Ohio
St. 290, 87 N.E. 185 (1909); Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 117 Atl.
54 (1922); Hart's Estate, 203 Pa. 480, 53 Atl. 364 (1902); Falls v. Car-
ruthers, 20 Tenn. App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605 (1936). But cf. United
States Trust Co. v. Oxnard, 66 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See gen-
erally Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 7, 25 (1961).
89 See, e.g., In the Matter of Free, 4 Misc. 2d 463, 148 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Surr.
Ct. 1956); In re Doughty's Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Surr. Ct. 1953). See
also Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 7, 27 (1961).
90 See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Voeth, 11 Misc. 2d 641, 173 N.Y.S.2d
113 (Surr. Ct. 1958) ("for the best interests of my estate" authorized
investments in nonlegals); In re Sullivan's Will, 123 N.Y.S.2d 159
(Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Brittain's Estate, 48 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Surr. Ct.
1944) (investments in nonlegals authorized by "in such manner as
to them shall appear advantageous"); In the Matter of Estate of Wil-
merding, 135 Misc. 674, 238 N.Y. Supp. 375 (Surr. Ct. 1929); In the
Matter of Will of Leavitt, 135 Misc. 387, 238 N.Y. Supp. 109 (Surr. Ct.
1929); In the Matter of McDowell, 102 Misc. 275, 169 N.Y. Supp. 853
(Surr. Ct. 1918). But cf. Mobley v. Phinizy, 42 Ga. App. 33, 155 S.E.
73 (1930). See also Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 7, 28 (1961).
91 See In the Matter of Jeffress, 198 Misc. 249, 97 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Surr. Ct.
1950), where the court said that such words as "seem best" or words
of like import connote a "freedom of choice" rather than restriction
of investments to "legals." See also In the Matter of Life's Fresh Air
Fund, 9 Misc. 2d 1026, 171 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. 1958); In the Matter
of Voeth, 11 Misc. 2d 641, 173 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Surr. Ct. 1958); In the
Matter of Free, 4 Misc. 2d 463, 148 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Surr. Ct. 1956);
In re Sullivan's Will, 123 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Surr. Ct. 1953); In the Matter
of McDowell, 102 Misc. 275, 169 N.Y. Supp. 853 (Surr. Ct. 1918); Willis
v. Braucher, 79 Ohio St. 290, 87 N.E. 185 (1909).
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However, investment clauses giving a trustee the power to invest,
"as if the trust fund was the trustee's own property,192 or "to exer-
cise the like absolute authority and discretion in making and chang-
ing any investment as the grantor personally could exercise," 93 or
"to invest,"94 have been held by the majority of the courts not to
authorize the investment in nonlegals by a trustee.
It must be remembered, however, that even though the words
of an investment clause indicate a "freedom of choice" rather than
a limitation to "legals," courts, in interpreting these investment
clauses, will look beyond the words of the clause and determine
the intention of the settlor.9 5 Thus, if a trustee is confronted with
an ambiguous investment clause, he must look to the intention of
the settlor as found by employing established canons of construc-
tion,96 rather than rely entirely on the words of the investment
clause.97 If the trustee is unable to find a clear expression of the
donor's intention, then it is recommended that the trustee either
adopt a very conservative investment policy which is clearly au-
thorized by the trust instrument, or ask a court for a judicial con-
struction of the investment provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
In drafting a trust instrument, it must be remembered that
the benefits derived from the trust by the income beneficiary and
remainderman will depend upon the type of investment power
which the trustee receives. If the trustee is limited to the "legal
list" or by special investment powers, the income beneficiary and
92 See, e.g., In re Staudinger's Will, 112 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Surf. Ct. 1952).
93 See, e.g., In the Matter of Will of Flagg, 192 Misc. 397, 81 N.Y.S.2d 514
(Surr. Ct. 1948); In the Matter of Estate of Toel, 180 Misc. 447, 39
N.Y.S.2d 898 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
94 See Clark v. Beers, 61 Conn. 87, 23 Ati. 717 (1891); Equitable Trust
Co. v. Snader, 20 Del. Ch. 278, 174 Atl. 132 (Ch. Ct. 1934).
95 See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 164.1 (2d ed. 1956).
96 See County of Holt v. Gallagher, 156 Neb. 457, 459, 56 N.W.2d 621, 623
(1953): "'General rules of construction of written instruments apply
to the construction of trust instruments, whether they are contracts,
deeds, or wills. The cardinal rule of construction is, of course, to de-
termine the intention of the settlor . ... "
97 See Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 1960); Hoge v.
Hoge, 17 Ill. 2d 209, 161 N.E.2d 117 (1959); Weishaar v. Burton, 132
Ind. App. 597, 179 N.E.2d 211 (1962); In the Matter of Estate of
Spross, 37 Misc. 2d 581, 236 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Surr. Ct. 1963); Lloyd v.
Campbell, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 329, 189 N.E.2d 660 (P. Ct. 1963); Clark v.
Clark, 411 Pa. 251, 191 A.2d 417 (1963).
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remainderman will fail to realize the benefits they may have re-
ceived had the trustee been given full investment powers. The
trustee who is limited to "legals" must exercise only reasonable
care in making investments. Theoretically, he could invest the
trust estate in legal securities which have been declared prudent
by the legislature, and thereafter remain indifferent to the chang-
ing needs of the beneficiaries and economic fluctuations. However,
the trustee who has full investment powers must exercise that de-
gree of care which a prudent man of intelligence and integrity
would exercise. He has a continuing duty to the trust to take active
charge of the estate, making corpus productive and disposing of
unproductive securities. Given such full investment power, he is
able to more readily effectuate the purposes of the trust.
Thomas H. DeLay '65
